An incident related by a CRS official in Jakarta illustrates well that army thinking is not primarily developmental. One village south of Manatuto had already been relocated twice because of low crop yield. The CRS man was on the spot when the local military commander said, waving his hand, that he would shift the camp again to a spot higher up. When the CRS official tentatively suggested ("one does not presume to advise the military") that a soil sample be taken first, the commander arbitrarily dismissed the idea as irrelevant.

The preoccupation of the military with security and pacification has not gone unchallenged within the regime. A memorandum prepared within Golkar early in 1980 and directed to the high command urges what it calls a programme of "strategic preventive counter-insurgency" in East Timor. According to the memorandum, positive development at all levels of Timorese life must form the centre of this programme because, "the social and material cost of a preventative programme is always cheaper than repressive measures. The urge to embrace must exceed the urge to strike." The memorandum, it is understood, fell on deaf ears. Civilianization and development are not priorities as a brief examination of the broad economic situation further demonstrates.

Due largely to the work of the international agencies, the Biafra-like situation of 1978-80 has passed. Nevertheless, the situation remains precarious. The economy has not been restored to working order, the people are not self-reliant and were the agencies on whom the bulk of the population depend to leave the situation is likely to regress to its earlier catastrophic state. Because of this, the International Red Cross will continue its work until April 1981, and possibly beyond, depending on its review of the situation at that point, whilst CRS is to stay for a further three years, emphasizing development.

Only limited cultivation has been conducted and the mediocre harvest returns have provided only temporary relief. Markets are functioning again in a number of centres but the marginal surplus from village gardens available for sale yields little in the way of cash return. Unemployment is widespread. Coffee and garden produce are brought cheaply by Chinese-administered army-controlled monopolies such as P. T. Denok (controlled by General Benny Moerdani), thereby denying the people access to

> have to be supported on less land . . . Flying over East Timor by helicopter, one is impressed by the thousands of acres of fields — for corn, dry rice etc. . . . — now going back to waste . . . the policy of denying land to the population may have to be rethought . . . (lest it) prove to be both economically and politically counter-productive (pp. 19-22 *passim).*

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other markets and better prices. Consumer prices are higher than in Jakarta. Dili shops are well-stocked but few can afford to buy. Complaints about the cost of living are widespread. Very few Timorese overseas are not sending money back to East Timor to support relatives. In these conditions, the tens of thousands of widows and orphans are especially vulnerable. The medical situation is also very serious, compounded by the lack of trained Timorese personnel and acute shortage of doctors from the outside.

Though the Indonesian Government claims to have spent U.S.$75 million on development in East Timor since 1976 and to have budgeted a further U.S.$37 million for the 1980-81 fiscal year, much of this appears to have been spent, showcase style, on cosmetic improvements in the capital and on education, the importance of which as a means of Indonesianization has not been overlooked. General agricultural development, however, despite its fundamental importance, has been neglected. The resettlement centre policy and the military preoccupation with security are responsibie for this.

The Indonesian Catholic Church is particularly concerned at the likely impact of Jakarta's future development plans on the people. A paper presented to Indonesian church leaders in July, 1980, argues that the people will be exploited and impoverished by large-scale projects which, it is feared, will mainly benefit a corrupt elite. According to the paper, grand schemes and large injections of foreign capital, personnel and consumer goods, are not in the best interests of the people. The objective should be to develop an autonomous economy based on the human and natural resources of the territory. The paper warns, "If this is disregarded, the Timorese will certainly become mere coolies, a one hundred per cent contradiction of their deep desire to develop in an autonomous way. The resulting frustration will be dangerous."

The Churches and East Timor PAT WALSH

Resistance to integration with Indonesia is not confined to Fretilin or guerilla warfare. While the Indonesian military has been partially successful in its attempts to separate the people physically from Fretilin, it has failed psychologically to overcome the deep-seated anti-Indonesian sentiment felt by the Timorese. Indonesian church people, aid workers, and the military are alike the subjects of this antipathy. As one Indonesian church

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worker reported: "Non-military Indonesians are also perceived as associates of the army, (which is seen by the people to be composed) of cruel people devoid of love and morality." This same person changed his name because the Timorese do not like his Javanese name. They are reluctant to talk to him for fear he might pass on information. They particularly avoided him when he made the mistake of wearing calf-length boots which the people associated with military uniform.

The enormous suffering and humiliation at the hands of a foreign nationality are responsible for this bitterness. "All the people are 'Fretilin' in this attitude," according to a Timorese priest. The people are known not to want to learn *Bahasa Indonesia,* to choose Catholic schools ahead of government schools, to collaborate with the guerilla resistance within limits, to be "confused and alienated" by life in the resettlement sites and to want to leave East Timor in large numbers (the Australian Imigration Department quotes a known figure of 20,000).

An important focus for these sentiments is the head of the East Timor Catholic Church, Mgr. da Costa Lopes. Not only is he refusing to integrate the Timor Catholic Church with the Indonesian Catholic Church but he also continues to appeal for a UN solution, a genuine plebiscite to determine the people's wishes. The full significance of this challenge to Indonesia becomes clear when it is realized that the proportion of Catholics in East Timor has dramatically risen from some 30% of the total population pre-1975 to more than 50% at the present time. Whatever the depth of faith of these recent converts from traditional Timorese religious beliefs, their alignment with the indigenous and highly influential Catholic Church is further evidence of their aspirations not to mention, of course, their search for security and protection.

The Indonesian Catholic Church respects the autonomy of the church in East Timor and supported by the Vatican, which has warned it to avoid exerting pressure for integration, has adopted a policy of detached service. This policy stops short of active political support. As an Indonesian churchman put it: the Indonesian Church "cannot help (the Church in Timor) in the way a large part of the Timorese people would like, namely to win freedom from Indonesia and become an autonomous Timorese State."

For its part, the Vatican, which has assumed direct control over the East Timor Church, is ambivalent in its attitude. The Vatican Secretariat of State regards East Timor as an occupied country in which there has been no genuine act of self-determination and will not recognize East Timor as part of Indonesia until the people and/or the UN indicate this is their wish. On the other hand, the Vatican has declined to make this position public, does not contribute to the annual UN deliberations on East Timor through its permanent UN representative, and is represented in Jakarta by a Nuncio who accepts the Indonesian presence in East Timor as a *fait accompli* and believes the situation under Indonesia is better than it was under Portugal.

Unfortunately, the sins of omission of the international Catholic Church have been exceeded only by the sins of commission of its Protestant brethren in Indonesia. Hostage to its fear of Islam and its own deep inferiority complex, the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) has solidly aligned itself with the Indonesian Government on the East Timor issue. DGI reports, *inter alia,* blame Fretilin for the suffering of the Timorese, minimize the death toll, support the government resettlement programme, call for transmigration, and blame the Australian press for the failure of the family reunion programme. In practice, its accelerated East Timor aid programme and the accelerated growth of the Protestant community there have been conducted in close collaboration with the Indonesian military with a view to promoting integration.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the DGI approach has been the subject of intense debate in recent times within sections of the international Protestant community and that the Australian Council of Churches has decided it cannot contribute to the DGI East Timor programme but must channel its development aid through the East Timor Catholic Church instead.

One might be tempted to excuse the DGI on the grounds that the Indonesian Government's campaign of misinformation and secrecy on East Timor has concealed the facts and misled the well-intentioned. Though this may have been legitimate once, it is no longer so. East Timor is no longer a closely kept military secret in Indonesia. Nor are the Government's alleged reasons for annexing its neighbour universally accepted any longer. Ignorance has given way to a sense of distress, even anger, at what has transpired in East Timor especially amongst those who have been there, and a growing number of well-placed Indonesians accept that East Timor is "our responsibility" at least in the area of individual human rights.